Azernews.Az

By Orkhan Amashov

Armenia is not exactly on the verge of unwaveringly conceding sovereignty over Karabakh to Azerbaijan via a firm and explicitly-worded official statement, but what is obvious is that, albeit reluctantly and unwillingly, it is becoming apparent through some ambiguous admissions that Yerevan is slowly coming to the worldview of Baku.

The prospects of this acquiescence appear to loom large prior to the summit meeting between Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, scheduled to take place in Brussels on 6 April 2022.

A journey to a comprehensive peace treaty, dictated by Azerbaijan, is an excruciatingly painful process of self-reflection for Armenia. The latter is gradually learning to sever its emotional ties with the old illusions and part with a once indefatigably-held policy of defending the indefensible and impracticable - the line that demanded the extrication of the region from Baku’s territorial jurisdiction.

Sticking point modified

Yerevan’s reaction to Baku’s five-point offer, which summarised Azerbaijan’s official line in writing, was one of implicit acquiescence. Armenia did not demur, but shifted its focus to the issue of the rights of Karabakh Armenians, in relation to whom Azerbaijan’s post-war rhetoric has been bold and based on a set-in-stone dictum that any specific set of rights enjoyed by the population in question should not constitute any form of administrative autonomy.

Both sides claim that negotiations over a peace deal must be held without preconditions, and each party has its own view as to what such a precondition might be, but the whole settlement unavoidably boils down to the question concerning the Armenians living in Karabakh.

Yerevan seems to be half-ready to accept that there is no future for the Armenian inhabitants of the region unless there is acceptance that they are living in Azerbaijan. Pashinyan has already articulated that, in the view of international law, that is indeed the case. The concept of “remedial secession”, which for long has been one of the key reference points of the separatists, no longer seems to be integral to Yerevan’s line, being last mentioned by the Armenian PM in June 2021.

Whilst commenting on the peace offer, Pashinyan stated that “there was nothing unacceptable” in what was communicated to Yerevan, but the document fell short of addressing the full spectrum of Azerbaijani-Armenian relations which, inter alia, entail the rights and freedoms of Karabakh Armenians.

A peace deal will need to address the nature of these claims. Yerevan will try to secure the recognition of the right to self-determination for Karabakh Armenians inside Azerbaijan, whereas Baku will take steps to ensure that the issue will be circumscribed to cultural rights.

One way of thinking prevailing in some quarters of the Armenian political elite is that, given the present dire situation, the most vital objective is to achieve a deal with Baku and ensure the continuance of Armenian presence in Karabakh, which may truly be endangered if a new escalation in the form of a mini-war cannot be avoided.

This appears to be in harmony with former Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s famous view, which was perceived in want of just ambition by the euphoric Armenian public when uttered in the mid-90s, that the existential goal was to guarantee that Armenians continued to inhabit Karabakh, and as long as they were physically there, the hope for a better future would remain alive.

The duty incumbent upon Pashinyan’s government is to prepare the nation for peace, and the recognition that Karabakh is Azerbaijan. This is an arduous and difficult task. Benjamin Poghosyan, Chairman at the Centre for Political and Economic Strategies, Yerevan, believes that the country is psychologically ready to accept this verdict, provided the rights of the Armenian segment of the region could be addressed in a more reassuring way.

New urgency

Azerbaijan, as the victorious nation, has been naturally most interested and therefore adamant in translating the results of the war from a ceasefire deal into a comprehensive peace agreement as quickly as possible since November 2020. The initial impression given was that Armenia, so as to obviate the unavoidable, would stick to procrastination.

Now it seems that Armenia, which has been in the doldrums for too long, is also in a hurry. There is a growing realisation that Baku, once determined to achieve a certain objective, is a force not to be trifled with – that was the overarching lesson of the Second Karabakh War.

What was also obvious from Yerevan’s reply was that there is still some hope on the Armenian side that the OSCE Minsk Group, the activities of which have scornfully and appositely referred to as “tourist diplomacy” in Baku, could potentially rise from its ashes.

The rationale here is not too difficult to understand. Baku views the OSCE Minsk Group as archaic and impotent. The organisation has not yet officially changed its terms of reference and very much lives in the past, making occasional references to the legal-diplomatic constructs worked out prior to the war.

For Yerevan, the OSCE Minsk Group’s anachronistic proclivity, which is badly in need of readjustment, is one of the last vestiges of its dying hope as to the specific status of the region.

On a different note, the ongoing war in Ukraine and the deteriorated relations between the U.S. and France on one side, and Russia on another, renders the OSCE Minsk Group's competence even more futile.

Another point which seems to sully Armenian minds is its dependence on Russia. Being under the Kremlin's radar did not yield a desired outcome during the war against Azerbaijan. Now there is even a worry that a new existential threat may come from Russia itself.

The view is that Moscow is primarily driven by its own vital priorities and, if the need arises, for the sake of certain geopolitical gains over Crimea or Donbas, Russia may “sell out” Armenia to Turkey and Azerbaijan.

For some, it seems almost certain that Ankara would have more value to Russia as a possible conduit to bypass Western sanctions than the fate of Armenia. On the whole, there is some undeniable truth to this fear. When the chips are down, the Kremlin will reflect and be guided by its interests, in the light of which Yerevan’s urges may seem irrelevant.

Aliyev’s meeting with Pashinyan could be the onset of substantive talks over a new peace deal. For three decades, Baku and Yerevan have contested the case with mutually exclusive and completely contrary narratives.

The recent exchange induced by Azerbaijan’s five-point plan makes one think that the sides are approaching a new framework, within which necessary talks could take place to achieve what is undoubtedly going to be a compromise of some sort, albeit strongly influenced by the interests of the victor.

The circumambient atmosphere of the present state of affairs is auspicious for a new start and a degree of optimism is appropriate.

---