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By Orkhan Amashov

The trilateral ceasefire declaration signed by the Azerbaijani, Russian and Armenian leaders on November 10, 2020, was a game-changer in the politics of the South Caucasus. That historic day, when Yerevan finally succumbed to the peace-enforcement measures of Baku and was forced to capitulate, was the dawn of a new era. A year after the November deal, many glittering ideas, previously unthinkable, are within the realm of possibility. The regional cooperation mechanism, referred to as a “3+3” platform, is one of those novelties the origins of which date back to that momentous day.

In view of the perceived decline of Western influence in the South Caucasus and new regional dynamics engendered by virtue of the consequences of the Second Karabakh War, the concept of bringing Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia together with their three larger neighbours, namely, Turkey, Russia and Iran, seems to have gained some momentum, and, if reinforced by a series of propitious developments further, may evolve into something which one perhaps could tentatively portray as a unified platform in the fullness of time.

First conceived in late 2020, the concept has been subject to various interpretations throughout this year. It was last discussed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his Turkish counterpart Mevlut Cavusoglu at their meeting on the margins of the G20 summit in Rome. The establishment of a mechanism comprising six actors is far away from being a foregone conclusion, as friction points among the players involved continue to persist irresistibly. Yet since the proposed platform does not necessitate a complete uniformity of vision in relation to all regional issues, one should not fall into the trap of overestimating the obvious obstacles that may appear to stand in the way of its implementation.

Inception

A new format, described as the “Six-Country Regional Cooperation Platform,” was first suggested by Ankara and received immediate support from Baku. In fact, one may say that it initially emerged as a joint proposal by the presidents of Turkey and Azerbaijan on Karabakh and on the unblocking of economic and transport communications in the region. Not long after this initiation, Tehran introduced a similar “3 + 3” model as a new post-war regional integration platform. During his visit to Moscow in early January 2021, former Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif referred to the six-party cooperation union in the region as the “most important goal of his trip”. Russia has also voiced its support through numerous official statements.

Although it may be said there are competing models of the “3+3” mechanism and there is no unified understanding of its content, the concept, in general, is based on bringing the participant countries together by means of integrating them into a web of expanding road and rail networks in the region, and as to this central precept, there is no disagreement.

Beyond simplicity

The “3+3” mechanism is contingent on the alignment of the regional interests and entails a complex picture, which is consistent with the present state of affairs in the South Caucasus. The region has long ceased to be an isolated backwater of the former Soviet Union. The dynamism and intricate relationships that define the region's present geopolitical architecture are too complex to be viewed from the prism of simple Russia-West competition. In fact, the South Caucasus is currently experiencing a geopolitical transition. The region, in the words of Paul Stronski, a senior fellow at Carnegie's Russian and Eurasia Programme, is rediscovering its historical geography.

Western retrenchment

The western interests in the region seem to be ebbing. The U.S. and EU appear to be in retreat. Their long-standing declaratory policies about the region's centrality in the West's agenda are no longer convincing. Any asseveration as to the emphasis on Eurasia, in general, appears to be fleeting and rhetorical. The U.S. focus is currently more on the Indo-Pacific region and containing China's rise is its main concern. Whereas the EU, troubled with internal concerns, is fatigued with a constant expansion and no longer desirous of penetrating into the geographies outside its traditional scope.

As to the “3+3” format, no Western power has yet issued an enthusiastic approbation and it is unlikely such support will ever be expressed. But there is a clear sense of appreciation that stability and economic integration cannot, in the long run, endanger the West’s key interests in the region. The U.S. and EU may detest the reaffirmation of the Russian influence or be wary of the increased Turkish presence in the South Caucasus, but any attempt to counteract the implementation of the said platform is out of the question.

Azerbaijan views the project as a vehicle enabling it to further project its rightful and historic gains, achieved after the Second Karabakh War, into a wider region. For Turkey and Russia, the mechanism serves the function of reaffirming their clout in the region. Iran may find itself in a uniquely advantageous position within the proposed format, as it is the only country that has regular diplomatic relations with all the three South Caucasus nations. Some optimists even argue that the format could play the same pacifying role for Armenia and Azerbaijan as the Coal and Steel Community played for post-war France and Germany in the 1950s.

Lukewarm reception by some

Georgia is sceptical of the format mainly due to the current state of its relations with Russia. Yet despite Tbilisi’s determination not to take part in any regional format with Moscow, Georgian Deputy PM and Foreign Minister David Zalkaliani recently stated that his country could potentially be somehow involved in the platform, as when there is a region-wide integration process underway, staying away is naturally not a wise course of action.

There is another factor that many believe underpins Georgia’s reluctance, and that is to do with the possibility that the northern trans-regional route passing through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey will be marginalised by reviving road and rail corridors to the south.

For Armenia, the difficulty of acceding to the platform stems from the fact the proposed mechanism is, in a sense, a joint Azerbaijan-Turkish initiative and based on a post-conflict reality, which came into being after Yerevan’s devastating defeat in the Second Karabakh War.

In addition, the revenge-driven segment of Armenian society believes a wider regional integration would render Armenia a lesser player, which will eventually find itself firmly attached to the orbit of its sworn enemies, Turkey and Azerbaijan. In fact, Robert Kocharyan, which represents the most regressive aspirations of the nation, in his recent interview with famous Russian journalist Vladimir Pozner, argued that the opening of borders with Ankara and a wider cooperation with regional players could transform Armenia into a “colony of Turkey”

On the whole, it is not an easy task to predict the way subsequent events will develop. The format provides a fertile ground for the readjustment of regional interests and coalesce different priorities into a unified platform. At this juncture, it is a mere suggestion, albeit strongly supported by the regional heavyweights and a long distance from being a fait accompli.

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