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The arrival of two Russian cargo ships, Sparta and Sparta II, at the port of Tartus on January 22 has intensified speculation about Russia's next steps in the Middle East and North Africa. With heavy weapons, military vehicles, and ammunition loaded on the ships, and Syria's abrupt termination of a 49-year lease agreement for the port, experts are questioning the implications for Moscow’s military presence in the region. A few months ago Russian military vessels were missing from a satellite image captured by American geospatial firm Planet Labs PBC on December 9, a day after Assad fled Syria. Ships were not seen in imagery clicked on December 1 and December 3 either, but that could be attributed to their participation in a joint military drill of the Russian Navy and its Aerospace Forces in the Mediterranean Sea. The exercise took place between December 1 and December 3.

Where will these ships head next? A growing number of experts believe that Libya is a probable destination. Also, what should we anticipate regarding Russia's stance in Syria, particularly in the Middle East?

Speaking to Azernews, Moscow-based political analyst Andrew Korybko commented, "Two Russian sources told TASS last week that their country hadn’t received any notification of Syria’s reported decision to terminate Russia’s 49-year-long lease of Tartous Port. Its naval base there and the air one in Khmeimim could be used for humanitarian purposes, the Russian Foreign Ministry later suggested, thus showing Moscow’s interest in retaining those facilities. Nevertheless, the EU demanded that Syria kick Russia out of them if it wants sanctions relief, and there’s a chance that this will happen."

Adding to the uncertainty, a Russian delegation, including Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and Special Presidential Envoy for Syria Alexander Lavrentiev, is visiting Syria to discuss the future of these bases. "This coincides with reports about Russia evacuating its military equipment from Tartus. Therefore, Russia is either preparing to fully withdraw from Syria or is drastically downscaling its military presence there, which would be due to recent events," Korybko noted.

As analysts consider potential destinations for Russia's forces, Libya appears to be the most likely option. Korybko explained, "Any drastic downscaling or withdrawal could see its forces in Syria transferred to Libya where reports claimed that Russia wants to establish air, naval, and even ground bases (the first two on the coast and the last in the hinterland near the Sudanese-Chadian border)."

Other possibilities, such as Sudan and Algeria, seem less probable due to political and logistical challenges. "Sudan is a less likely destination since there hasn’t been much progress on Russia’s naval logistics facility in Port Sudan in the years since it was agreed upon, with this being attributable to American pressure and the ongoing Civil War," Korybko stated.

Similarly, Algeria presents complications despite its long-standing military partnership with Russia. Korybko elaborated, "Algeria is another unlikely place for its forces from Syria to be transferred to in spite of being Russia’s decades-long military partner. That’s because those two are at odds over the African Corps’ (formerly Wagner) role in Mali after Bamako withdrew from the 2015 Algiers Accords last year. Last summer’s Tuareg ambush of the African Corps in close proximity to the Algerian border led some in Russia to suspect that Algeria is at the very least passively facilitating those armed groups."

Korybko also highlighted the broader geopolitical implications of such a move: "To be sure, bilateral relations remain strong, but this nascent mistrust might complicate any speculative plans for Russia to transfer its forces from Syria to Algeria. Moreover, Algeria could also request Russian concessions in Mali in exchange for its agreement to host those forces and let them establish bases, the terms of which might be unacceptable to Moscow. There’s also the spectre of EU pressure upon Algeria since the bloc would frown upon it letting Russian forces deploy there right on its southern doorstep."

Ultimately, Korybko emphasized, "For these reasons, Libya – and particularly its eastern reaches that are under the control of General Haftar – is the most likely destination for Russia’s forces from Syria if they’re indeed being transferred, though it remains to be seen whether this is indeed the case and what scale it’ll be at if so. In that event, it’s possible that the UN-recognized and jointly Western- and Turkish-backed Government of National Accord in Western Libya might clash with Haftar, which could open a new front in the New Cold War."

The potential repositioning of Russian forces reflects the shifting dynamics of its presence in the region, leaving open questions about the broader implications for Moscow’s strategy in the Middle East and North Africa.